WILLIS TRUST COMPANY LTD AND ANOR V R JOHN GREEN AND ANOR HC AK CIV-2006-404-809 [2006] NZHC 154 (1 March 2006)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2006-404-809
IN THE MATTER OF the Judicature Amendment Act 1972
BETWEEN WILLIS TRUST COMPANY LTD
First Plaintiff
AND IAN LAYWOOD AND GARY JAMES
REES
Second Plaintiffs
AND R JOHN GREEN
First Defendant
AND HOLMES CONSTRUCTION
WELLINGTON LTD
Second Defendant
Hearing: 1 March 2006
Appearances: David Carden for Plaintiffs
Sherwyn Williams for Second Defendant
Judgment: 1 March 2006
JUDGMENT OF HARRISON J
SOLICITORS Alexander Dorrington (Auckland) for Plaintiffs
Kensington Swan (Wellington) for Second Defendant
COUNSEL David Carden
WILLIS TRUST COMPANY LTD AND ANOR V R JOHN GREEN AND ANOR HC AK CIV-2006-404-809 1 March 2006
[1] The first and second plaintiffs, Willis Trust Company Ltd and Messrs Ian Laywood and Gary Rees, have applied for interim orders pursuant to s 8 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 in these circumstances.
[2] On 26 March 2004 Willis and the second defendant, Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd, entered into a contract for construction work. Willis planned to develop apartments on its site at 266 Willis Street, Wellington. They are known as the Augusta Apartments.
It contracted Holmes to construct the buildings for a price of $8.066 million. The terms and conditions of the contract are complex.
[3] On 9 September 2004 Messrs Laywood and Rees, who are directors of Willis, signed a contract of guarantee in Holmes' favour. Its terms are open to ambiguity. Arguably Messrs Laywood and Rees jointly guaranteed payment to Holmes of a discrete contract price
of $250,881 relating to rooftop apartments at the site.
[4] Willis pleads that Holmes had commenced construction in or about
November 2003 and that the contractual engineer, Mr Chris Hoskins, certified for
practical completion in June 2005.
[5] Two months earlier, on 6 April 2005, Willis and Holmes signed an agreement
for resolution of certain disputes which had arisen under the principal contract.
Materially this later agreement provided that any issues not resolved should be
referred to arbitration by Mr Anthony Dean or some other person. It is sufficient to
record for these purposes that Mr Dean was never called upon to issue an award.
[6] On 20 September 2005 Mr Hoskins certified that no funds were owing by
Willis to Holmes in terms of the principal contract. However, on 28 October 2005
Holmes gave Willis notice of adjudication under the Construction Contracts Act
2002. It referred to six claims in dispute and sought relief. The first defendant,
Mr John Green, was appointed as adjudicator. Holmes particularised its claim on
9 November 2005. Willis responded on 23 November 2005.
[7] On 10 February 2006 Mr Green issued his determination. In summary, he
found Willis liable to pay Holmes $1.16 million inclusive of GST and $58,655 in
interest as damages. He also held that Messrs Laywood and Rees were jointly and
severally liable to pay Holmes $282,241 inclusive of GST together with $14,248 in
interest as damages. He approved the issue of a charging order in Holmes' favour
over the subject property. Also he made certain costs awards.
[8] On 20 February 2006 Willis and Messrs Laywood and Rees filed this proceeding. They allege that the determination was wrong on two discrete grounds.
First, Holmes claims that the adjudicator erred in law in exercise of a statutory power
under the Construction Contracts Act or, alternatively, that the dispute resolution
agreement estops Holmes from enforcing its rights under the determination. Second,
Messrs Laywood and Rees allege that the adjudicator erred by imposing personal
liability upon them for any amount; they say that the terms of their guarantee do not
extend to Willis' adjudicated liability to Holmes.
[9] Contemporaneously with filing their substantive claim, Willis and Messrs
Laywood and Rees applied for interim orders (s 8 Judicature Amendment Act 1972)
prohibiting Holmes from taking any steps to enforce any of the adjudicated
determinations until their substantive claim is determined. Mr David Carden, who
appears for the plaintiffs, submits essentially that both entities have good arguable
cases in law and that if interim orders are not made then their substantive
application will be imperilled. He submits that the consequence of success on the applications for judicial review will be to relieve Willis and Messrs Laywood and Rees from all liability under the determination. He submits that an interim order is necessary for
the purpose of preserving the status quo.
[10] Mr Sherwyn Williams for Holmes opposes the application. Among other
things, he submits that the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant substantive relief
under the Judicature Amendment Act in the sense that it cannot negate or derogate
from the express terms of the Construction Contracts Act. Additionally his
comprehensive and constructive notice of opposition disputes the strength of the
plaintiffs' application for judicial review. He also submits that the overall justice of
the case does not require an interim order. In that respect he refers to Holmes'
deprivation of access to funds due and owing to it under the contract for a significant
period and its entitlement to enforce the adjudicator's determination by entering
judgment and obtaining charging orders. If interim relief is granted, Willis may
dispose of the land and dissipate funds. Consequently Holmes would suffer
substantial if not irreversible prejudice.
[11] I heard oral argument from Mr Carden this morning. The legal issues appear
complex. Some or all of them may be tenable. I have not, of course, heard
Mr Williams orally in opposition. However, he confirms that the principal basis of
Holmes' resistance to Willis' application is a concern that any delays in enforcement
of the determination will have adverse financial consequences.
[12] I am satisfied, on a preliminary basis at least, that some of the arguments
raised by Mr Carden in support of the substantive applications by Willis and Messrs
Laywood and Rees should proceed to a hearing. In the event that their challenge to
the determination is successful, wholly or in part, then Willis and Messrs Laywood
and Rees would also be prejudiced by payment of the sums owing if they were
unable to recover them substantially or promptly from Holmes.
[13] As is frequently the case, determination of this application involves a
balancing of rights and interests. During argument I raised with counsel the prospect
of making an interim order in the terms sought but subject to conditions requiring
payment to a stakeholder of the disputed amounts. Counsel conferred and took
instructions but were unable to agree.
[14] I record Mr Carden's advice that 34 of the 37 Augusta Apartments have been
sold but that neither Willis nor Messrs Laywood and Rees have sufficient funds to
pay the determined amounts into Court or to a stakeholder. Apparently Willis has
land available adjacent to the site. Its proposal is to develop a second stage of the
apartment project there. It has offered Holmes a charging order over it to secure the
adjudicated amounts wholly or in part. Mr Williams advises that the terms offered
are unsatisfactory to Holmes but, with commendable realism, he does not oppose an
interim order, providing that Holmes' existing rights are properly secured.
[15] Accordingly, I make an order prohibiting Holmes from taking any steps to
enforce any determinations or orders made by the adjudicator in his determination
dated 10 February 2006 until further order of this Court, upon conditions that:
(1) Willis is to pay to a stakeholder to be agreed between the parties the
sums of $1.16 million and $58,655 (or to provide such other security
for payment as is satisfactory to Holmes) together with costs as
awarded, on or before midday on 9 March 2006;
(2) The nominated stakeholder is to hold the funds in an interest bearing
account pending determination of this proceeding or further order of
the Court;
(3) Willis and Messrs Laywood and Rees are to apply to this Court by
midday on 9 March 2006 for a priority fixture for determination of
their substantive application for judicial review. Once a date is fixed
(presumably for a hearing of two days duration), counsel are to agree
upon a timetable for exchanging written submissions in advance. The
documents produced as exhibits in the comprehensive affidavit sworn
by Mr Laywood on 20 February 2006 should constitute a core bundle
together with any additional documents relied upon by the parties;
(4) Holmes is prohibited from taking any further steps to register and
enforce its application to the District Court at North Shore for a
charging order against Willis until midday on 9 March 2006;
(5) In the event that Willis fails to satisfy any of the preceding conditions,
time being of the essence, the terms of the interim order relating to it
shall be discharged, with the consequence that Holmes will be free to
enforce the terms of the adjudication against Willis. In that event,
however, Messrs Laywood and Rees will remain obliged to pursue
their claims for a priority fixture. (In this respect I record that I am
exempting them from obligations to provide security because of the
prima facie strength of their case for challenging the adjudicator's
determination against them).
[16] Mr Green, who is sued as first defendant, advises that he will abide the
decision of the Court.
[17] I direct the registry to arrange a telephone conference between me and
counsel at 8.45 a.m. on 15 March 2006.
[18] Costs of today's hearing are reserved.
Rhys Harrison J